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Military planning for the Gallipoli landings overall was hasty and confused, with
relatively little consideration given to medical support. The site initially chosen for
the allied operational base was the island of Lemnos, despite the fact that it had poor
water supplies and was exposed the heavy gales through the Mediterranean spring. It was
then decided to shift the operational base to Alexandria, some 16,000 kilometres from the
front line. Lemnos was to be used solely to assemble troops prior the assault on the
peninsula.
Senior medical officers were gravely disturbed by the distance between Lemnos and
Alexandria, especially given that provisions for hospital facilities on the island were
set below what was recommended under established guidelines for half the number of men
who would be sent into battle. If heavy casualties were incurred, they reasoned, there
would be grave congestion on Lemnos, and great strain on available ship-based medical
facilities. It also appeared clear that too few transports would be available for the
transfer of wounded to base hospitals in Egypt.
Further, hospital facilities in Egypt were well below what the campaign required. The
decision of November 1914 to situate and train Australian troops in Egypt greatly
confused medical arrangements. For at the outset of the war it had been agreed that the
British war office would assume responsibility for the treatment of dominion troops after
their evacuation from the field of conflict. However, the decision to keep these men in
Egypt meant that the Australian and local British military were obliged at short notice
to assume virtually full responsibility for health care.
Despite concerted efforts by senior British and Australian medical officers to expand and
fit out hospital facilities in Egypt, medical support was far below the level needed to
receive casualties from the assault on Gallipoli.
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